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appropriate and effective banking 
supervision solutions.
A potential disinclination for insti-
tutions in one country to co-operate 
wholeheartedly with their counterparts 
in another country further muddies the 
waters. A simple rule of thumb is that 
the more cultural similarities there are 
between different countries the great-
er will be their mutual awareness and 
so their tendency to co-operate. By 
contrast, countries that are culturally 
dissimilar will tend to demonstrate a 
noticeably lower degree of interest 
in significant co-operation. Banks in 
northern Europe will have a natural af-
finity with their peer group, but less so 
with, for example, banks from Africa.
If all countries were identical, it 
would be easy to agree on the right 
structure for international regulation 
and implementation would be straight-
forward. However, countries differ in 
practice along various dimensions, 
which increases the cost of closer co-
operation and convergence. Countries 
differ in their legal systems, which 
makes it hard to specify a common set 
of rules and standards, forcing cum-
bersome adaptation of general princi-
ples to local circumstances.
Heterogeneity can arise from a dif-
ferent reliance of economies on banks 
and from differences in market struc-
tures. This influences the cost of bank 
failures but also the ease with which 
banks can be resolved. Heterogeneity 
can arise from differences in preferenc-
es. Countries may differ, for example, 
in how they view the role of the gov-
ernment in the economy (one conse-
quence being differences in state own-
The failure of internationally active fi-
nancial institutions, such as Lehman 
Brothers, and cross-border banks, 
such as Fortis, Dexia or the Icelandic 
banks, played a prominent role dur-
ing the global crisis. The collapse and 
rescue of UK banks Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds/HBOS fol-
lowed shortly thereafter, leaving both 
banks effectively nationalised. While 
Lloyds is now completely privately 
owned, RBS remains around 72 per cent 
UK state-owned.
As a result of the events that com-
bined to create the global financial 
crisis, there grew recognition that 
memorandums of understanding and 
supervisory colleges are not sufficient 
to deal with large and systemically im-
portant cross-border financial institu-
tions. Something more had to be done. 
Closer co-operation between supervi-
sors, especially in the resolution phases, 
is one of the solutions identified, with 
currency unions such as the Eurozone 
even setting up a banking union. EU au-
thorities are pushing for the banking 
union to be complete by October 2018.
A paper that I co-wrote with 
Thorsten Beck of the Cass Business 
School at City University in London, 
sets out to analyse the main trade-
offs in modern banking supervision. 
My aim in this article is to describe 
certain elements of our joint research 
and articulate our conclusions to a 
broader audience.
The precise and proper level for 
bank supervision remains in question. 
The debate is very much coloured by 
the inherent complexity of the sub-
ject, whether at the domestic or the 
more challenging cross-border level. 
Adding further shades and nuances to 
the underlying complexity are the po-
litical constraints almost inevitably im-
posed upon those charged with iden-
tifying, formulating and implementing 
“…the regularity and growing size of bank 
collapses down the centuries suggests that 
failures – human or institutional – still happen.”
The practice of banking supervision has been thrust very firmly into 
the spotlight since the great global financial crisis began to unfold 
over a decade ago. In that time it has been the subject of endless 
debate and much disagreement.
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ership), focus on fiscal independence 
or with respect to their risk tolerance.
A question occasionally, and very 
justifiably asked, is: why is banking su-
pervision needed? Surely the industry 
attracts staff with an inclination to de-
liver service to customers and to do so 
efficiently. However, the regularity and 
growing size of bank collapses down 
the centuries suggests that failures – 
human or institutional – still happen. 
Supervision is made necessary by a 
combination of factors. These include, 
but are not necessarily limited, to the 
following:
• A lack of competence by staff in at-
tempting to carry out the duties for 
which they have been trained. Failures 
at the individual level may result in 
large costs for society.
• Sheer size: as in the case of RBS, 
which grew from being a modest re-
gional bank into the world's fifth-larg-
est bank. The bank famously had to be 
rescued by the UK government follow-
ing its ill-timed purchase of ABN AMRO 
of the Netherlands.
• The unique nature of the banking 
industry is a further factor. Businesses 
in any industry can and do go bust. 
Governments can usually allow such 
businesses to fail, with equanim-
ity, because the adverse fall-out will 
largely be restricted to the company 
itself, its shareholders, its creditors and 
its customers.
Even when supranational regulation 
is desirable from a cross-country per-
spective, individual countries’ incentives 
of moving from domestic to suprana-
tional supervision can vary significantly. 
This explains why the move to supra-
national regulation often falls prey to 
political obstacles. For instance, coun-
tries may be of a different size, which 
may result in a supranational supervisor 
adopting to a greater extent the prefer-
ences of the larger country. This may re-
duce – or even eliminate – the incentives 
for smaller countries to join.
Similarly, a country with an inter-
national financial centre might object 
to supranational supervision as this is 
likely to result in an outcome that forc-
es the country to internalise a larger 
part of the externalities posed by its 
banking system.
The collapse of a major bank will 
however almost always cause system-
ic and social costs. Customers can face 
the loss of their money as a result of a 
bank's determination to maximise prof-
its. There are few governments brave 
enough to allow this to happen to retail 
depositors, however much faith they 
might possess in capitalism. Hence the 
close supervision by conduct authori-
ties, central banks and supranation-
al institutions aimed at reducing the 
chances of a systemic event.
Towards conclusion
Our main hypothesis is that a one-
size-fits-all approach is neither desir-
able nor realistic, as benefits and costs 
from moving towards supranational 
solutions differ greatly across different 
regions. Instead, we propose that the 
extent to which the regulatory architec-
ture becomes supranational should be 
determined at the regional level, and 
sometimes even be country- or insti-
tution-specific. In particular, it should 
be set according to two factors: the 
strength of cross-border externalities 
from financial instability, and the ex-
tent of heterogeneity across the coun-
tries in question.
The global financial crisis demon-
strated beyond a shadow of doubt 
that many commercial banks needed 
to be better regulated, better super-
vised and better capitalised. They also 
needed to take on less risk. These con-
siderations have not yet been fully ad-
dressed. At least Italy's banks, still bur-
dened with non-performing loans, are 
at last facing up to reality and selling 
distressed assets where they can find a 
willing buyer.
But there is no room for compla-
cency. All other issues aside, regulators 




‘If we want banks to operate un-
der the same rules and under the 
same supervision across our con-
tinent, then we should encour-
age all Member States to join the 
Banking Union. We need to reduce 
the remaining risks in the banking 
systems of some of our Member 
States. 
Banking Union can only function if 
risk-reduction and risk-sharing go 
hand in hand.’ 
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the 
European Commission, State of the 
Union Address (13 September 2017). 
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market commentator has observed in 
the past, there is only one institution 
more dangerous than a bank with too 
little capital, and that is a bank with too 
much capital. 
This article draws its inspiration from 
the paper Supranational Supervision: 
How Much and for Whom?, written 
by Thorsten Beck and Wolf Wagner. 
Accepted for publication in the 
International Journal of Central Banking.
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and supervisors, like army generals, 
have a long history of being backward 
looking rather than forward looking. 
They have a reputation for tackling the 
battles of history rather than the bat-
tles of the future. 
Banks will almost inevitably push 
back against the constraints being 
placed upon them, perhaps arguing 
that 'this time it's different' (arguably 
the four most alarming words in the 
financial industry).
Banks also display ingenuity in 
finding ways round regulations. That, 
combined with a willingness to put his-
tory behind them, represents a dan-
ger. As more than one experienced 
“The global financial crisis demonstrated  
beyond a shadow of doubt that many 
commercial banks needed to be better 
regulated…”
 OPINION
‘A complete Banking Union is essen-
tial for the future of the Economic 
and Monetary Union and for a fi-
nancial system that supports jobs 
and growth. We want a banking sec-
tor that absorbs crises and shares 
risks via private channels, thus en-
suring that taxpayers are not first in 
line to pay. Today we are presenting 
pragmatic ideas to move forward 
with risk sharing and risk reduction 
in parallel. We hope that these will 
be a useful food for thought for EU 
co-legislators to reach consensus on 
the remaining measures by 2018.’
Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President for 
Financial Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union (11 October 2017). 
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